

**THE BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS
DURHAM, NORTH CAROLINA**

Monday, November 5, 2007

9:00 A.M. Worksession

MINUTES

Place: Commissioners' Room, second floor, Durham County Government Administrative Complex, 200 E. Main Street, Durham, NC

Present: Chairman Ellen W. Reckhow, Vice-Chairman Becky M. Heron, and Commissioners Philip R. Cousin Jr. (arrived at 9:25 a.m.) and Michael D. Page

Absent: Commissioner Lewis A. Cheek

Presider: Chairman Reckhow

Motion to Excuse

Vice-Chairman Heron moved, seconded by Commissioner Page, to excuse Commissioner Cheek from the November 5, 2007 Worksession.

The motion carried with the following vote:

Ayes: Cousin, Heron, Page, and Reckhow

Noes: None

Absent: Cheek

Citizen Comments

Mr. John Monroe and Ms. Kathryn Spann requested to speak to the Commissioners about their concerns regarding the possible site of the Government's Level 4 laboratory in Butner, NC.

Mr. Monroe made the following comments:

"1. We don't dispute that there may be a need for a new germ lab for agriculture and bio defense to keep our food supply safe, and to reduce the threat of bio terrorism. We, however, have a concern that the Butner site, one of 4 or 5 finalist sites, may be actually chosen. We don't believe an absolutely safe lab can be built and operate. We believe that germs will get out, and that the Butner site presents some unique challenges that will affect the entire region. We entreat you as the governing body for our county, the body that represents our interests, to study and learn about this issue and hopefully after becoming fully informed, are prepared to issue a proclamation opposing the sitting of the facility here. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is currently studying each site and one factor that is said to matter is

the level of community acceptance. A strong statement opposing the lab here will be very helpful we hope.

2. The DHS wants us to believe they can construct and operate a safe level 4 lab. Level 4 is the highest security level lab which will study the most dangerous and lethal pathogens known to man. These are diseases with no known treatment or cure; they are fatal. Although a lab to study animal diseases, it will also study zoonotic diseases, which are diseases that can spread from animal to man, and man to animal. Vectors that spread these diseases include blood-sucking flying insects (i.e. horse and deer flies) and ticks. Pathogens can also travel and infect through the air, an especially dangerous route with the possibility of infecting large numbers of people quickly. Previous history with the government's animal disease lab makes us question that assumption that a safe lab can be built and operated. The Plum Island facility, the previous Department of Agriculture disease lab (level 3 safety), did not succeed in keeping the germs inside. An island off the end of Long Island, Plum Island had at least one admitted pathogen release from the lab, and some feel other diseases may have escaped from the lab as well but were never acknowledged by the government. Actually, the recent report commissioned by congress (GAO) speaks to the problem of the disincentive to reveal and report accidents and problems.
3. Despite assurances that there will be no problem of germ leakage, it seems all too possible that over the course of the life of the lab, there will be an accident due to any number of possible factors. These factors could be mechanical failures and breakdowns, natural disasters, and human factors (i.e. accidents, scientific miscalculation, human behaviors) that can interfere with judgment and safe functioning, including sleep deprivation, life stressors, and personality factors, and even mal intent. If an outbreak occurred, there is no systematic mechanism to track down the human illnesses that would be cropping up in at-risk populations (Durham County) and connecting the dots. Our doctors and emergency room staff in Durham would be unwittingly the first responders not knowing what was occurring and becoming exposed and infected themselves. In addition, when we consider the site being placed in Butner, an additional question becomes apparent that has to be answered—how would an evacuation / quarantine be accomplished? There is a moral question here too, since those who are institutionalized have no freedom to leave and move.
4. Butner is a unique site in that there are approximately 6,000 wards of the state and federal government in its care in a number of institutions from immediately adjacent (C.A. Dillon School) to only several miles from the proposed site. These include State inmates in the super max facility at Polk, the 4,000 inmates at the FCC, the profoundly retarded and developmental disabled people at Murdock, as well as the mental patients being treated in the new Dix/Umstead facility. Common sense would suggest that to evacuate these people would take at least a 1:1 ratio of responders—all in biohazard suits. Where is this army of trained and outfitted responders going to come from? Even if an evacuation were able to be accomplished, would these people be held in quarantine, if needed, or housed? It seems like an impossible situation that no one is looking at, based on the belief that the need wouldn't occur. I asked the

director of Butner's Public Safety a week ago about this and he replied that 'don't put the cart before the horse' and 2) rest assured they will get the needed resources.

North Durham and the rest of the triangle would be the epicenter of a disease outbreak. A dead zone could be created. North Durham, in my opinion, is one of the most beautiful areas in our region. It is a true gemstone. The open space, the farmland, the Eno river park, the historic sites, the tasteful Treyburn development, the state game lands are some of the many reasons to feel proud and to protect this area. Many of the ways people enjoy this area is being outside. Will you ever feel comfortable again walking in a park and having an insect bite you, not knowing if you will become sick and die? Your experience has been spoiled. Why take a chance and possibly ruin our land? We don't really need this type of development. We are not hurting economically and don't need whatever monies would come from this project. This lab should be sited in an isolated area, perhaps a desert or frigid area where germ leakage would pose less of a threat to human health. Please learn about this lab and take a stand against it."

Ms. Spann gave the following comments:

"The Umstead Research Farm, where the proposed research site is located, straddles the Durham-Granville county line. Durham County residents are closer to the proposed facility than anyone in Granville County. The facility would be the size of five Wal-Marts and would replace a facility which has been on 840-acre Plum Island, NY for more than 50 years. Indeed, we remain somewhat baffled as to the reason for moving from Plum Island to a significantly smaller site on the mainland.

There are four possible levels of safety measures at a biological research lab, ranging from BSL-1 at the mildest to BSL-4 at the most intensive. BSL-4 labs are required for the study of certain diseases which are highly infectious and for which there are no vaccines or treatments. There's another type of lab, BSL-3Ag, which has almost all of the BSL-4 features, for researching highly infectious animal diseases. There are only a handful of BSL-4 and BSL-3Ag labs in the country.

The safety measures for these labs are of two types: building features and rules for the people who work there. The first line of protection is the building, which is supposed to have airlocks with negative air pressure in the labs, special waste treatment mechanisms, and many other highly technical containment features. However, over time, air ducts develop cracks (caulking cracks, sewer lines cracks). Filters must be changed. If government budgets run short, or facility maintenance is privatized, and building maintenance is shortchanged over the coming years or decades, leaks of disease agents will occur. It is only a matter of time. And we all know how hard it can be to get funding for even such worthy goals as school construction.

Even if all the systems in the building work perfectly, the humans working inside can be sleep-deprived, complacent about their work, lazy, distracted, angry at their bosses, eager to pursue their own research idea even though the boss turned it down, etc. Any and all of these factors can and has resulted in the accidental release of disease agents at labs.

The Butner site isn't on an island, or in a desert. There's no natural barrier to stop diseases from moving off the site if they get out of the building.

The potential effects of error in this context are particularly grave. Unlike a chemical release, as recently occurred in Apex, we can't smell germs. We can't see them in the air, in the mud on our feet, or in that mosquito that just bit us. We don't know they're on the hand of the person we just greeted. There's no sensor wand you can wave to determine the presence of a disease, unlike radioactive contamination. So, a disease release may take weeks to show up in an infected person or animal, by which time it has spread to many other individuals.

Plum Island's history shows this, from the time it was first built and continuing to the present date. That history is documented in a book, Lab 257, and in two reports commissioned by Congress from the Government Accounting Office, one in 2003 and one just completed in September of this year. The 2003 GAO report noted that:

- Earlier that year, there was a strike by maintenance workers employed by private outside contractors. Striking workers sabotaged the water system on the first day of the strike; they could just as easily have sabotaged the steam pipes which are a key part of the decontamination process. No security system can forestall a strike.
- Plum Island did not have adequate controls over access to the disease materials. For example, 8 scientists from other countries were found working in the bio-containment area without completed background investigations. Plum Island lacked enough personnel to escort and monitor outside scientists when they were in the bio-containment area. The facility didn't have background checks on students who came to the facility for classes in the bio-containment area. Outside maintenance workers were allowed into the bio-containment area without the escorts which were required by the facility's rules. Plum Island management failed to maintain adequate control over who received copies of keys and master keys. There were no name checks or background checks on contractors and visitors who entered the bio-containment area.
- Plum Island, which like the proposed site straddles two counties, could not predict which local law enforcement officials would be able to provide backup in the event of an emergency, and whether they would have enough officers to respond. This situation is equally possible here, particularly since the proposed facility would be at the border between Durham and Granville counties. Here, where Durham City and County have significantly more emergency responders than compared to Butner and Creedmoor. Moreover, who trains law enforcement officers in what to do in the event of an accidental release of pathogens? What if there is a fire? What if there is a forest fire – in a prolonged drought of the sort this area is currently experiencing, the risk of fire is particularly acute? What if there is an ice storm and employees can't get there for a week, as is common in this rural area?
- During Hurricane Bob, Plum Island's power was out for nearly a day, and its backup generators had been down for three months. For three days, only three workers were

available to run the entire facility of hundreds of rooms and animals, trying to handle the wastes of large infected animal with a hand pump.

- In 1998, animals at the Plum Island facility caught foot & mouth disease in a part of the facility that was supposed to be isolated from the virus.
- And, as detailed in Lab 257, Incinerators on Plum Island were also used to incinerate radioactive waste, which workers failed to monitor, despite rules requiring them to do so. The proposed facility, which is substantially larger, will also rely on an incinerator to deal with a substantial portion of its waste.

Plum Island is far from unique in its failings.

- In Surrey, England, just this August, there was a release of foot and mouth disease from a local lab which was discovered only after cattle in the area were found to be infected. The outbreak was ultimately traced to cracked sewer lines, which leaked material, creating mud, which was carried off the site by automobiles. In 2001, there was another outbreak of foot and mouth disease in the U.K., which resulted in the slaughter of 7 million animals, at an estimated cost to the country of more than \$11 billion.
- The SARS outbreak in Asia was caused by research staff who fell ill after working on the virus.
- At the Center for Disease Control (CDC) in Atlanta, lighting blew out the power this summer, and the backup generators didn't come on. It was later revealed that outside contractors working in the area cut the grounding wire by mistake. Also this summer, there was extensive media coverage regarding a man who had contracted drug-resistant tuberculosis, left the country, and was detained when he tried to come back. That man's father-in-law works at the CDC.
- At the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, tuberculosis escaped a safety cabinet after a blower fan failed to shut off, and pushed the disease-laden air into the lab room; the alarm that was supposed to sound had been turned off. The U.S. Army had just inspected and approved the facility one month earlier.
- Over the past year, there was a release of the zoonotic disease Q fever at Texas A&M University, which has now been ordered to stop research into potential bio-weapons while an investigation takes place. Q fever can cause death in infected humans.
- Also at Texas A&M, a worker contracted brucellosis after cleaning out a high-containment cabinet like those that will be at the proposed NBAF facility.
- At the University of New Mexico, one worker was jabbed with an anthrax-laden needle and another with a syringe containing an undisclosed genetically engineered microbe.

These are just a few examples of the ways in which diseases can escape from even modern, high-security facilities.

If one of these diseases is released, the consequences for the community may be very grave. These diseases can be transmitted, variously, by air; mosquitoes, ticks, and other parasitic insects, and by contact with a person or surface or material bearing the disease. Incubation periods vary considerably, which means that by the time an outbreak is discovered, the disease may have spread considerably. Because there are no treatments or vaccines for these diseases, infected animals must be quarantined and destroyed. As to those diseases to be studied at the site which can also affect humans, it remains to be seen how Homeland Security will choose to deal with infected humans, or those suspected of carrying the infection.

Congress has recently become concerned about the increasing number of BSL-3 and BSL-4 research labs across the country, hence the 2007 report and September Congressional hearings, prompted among other things by the accidental releases and a subsequent cover-up at Texas A & M University. The 2007 GAO report noted:

- There is no centralized government oversight of those labs, which are left to self-police, even in the face of significant disincentives to report accidental releases of diseases. For example, individuals fear loss of their jobs; labs fear loss of funds, or even that they will be shut down.
- With more and more people working in more and more BSL-4 labs, the statistical probability of a major accidental release is increasing.
- Workers who move back and forth between BSL-3 and BSL-4 labs frequently muddle the safety procedures, reverting to the lower level safety procedures with which they're more accustomed.

Ultimately, one of the most problematic facets of the proposed laboratory is lack of accountability. This facility will be operated under the auspices of the Department of Homeland Security, which, while technically subject to the Freedom of Information Act, tends to invoke security concerns as a ground for nondisclosure. Indeed, efforts to use the Freedom of Information Act to obtain information on existing BSL-3 and BSL-4 government labs and research, from agencies such as the CDC, the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, and National Institute of Health, have been stymied for years.

The risks posed by the proposed facility present this Board with one of, if not the most, significant public health issues ever to confront Durham County. We thank you for your time, and your careful consideration of these issues on behalf of Durham's citizens."

The Board thanked Mr. Monroe and Ms. Spann for their concerns and comments.

Directives

1. Ms. Spann to provide copies of the congressional reports and the Lab 257 report to the Board; provide additional information regarding the existing labs.
2. County Manager to follow up on some of the issues mentioned.
3. Staff to collect additional information regarding the possible site of the Government's Level 4 laboratory.

Progress Report from the Durham Affordable Housing Coalition (DAHC) on the Implementation of Durham's 10-Year Plan to End Homelessness & Review of the Agreement between Triangle United Way and DAHC for Implementation of the Plan for the Period of September 1, 2007 through June 30, 2008.

Heidi York, Assistant County Manager, introduced this item, stating that in October 2006, a Memorandum of Agreement was entered into by the City of Durham, the County of Durham, and Triangle United Way for the implementation of the 10-Year Plan to End Homelessness. As stated in the Agreement, United Way entered into a contract with an implementing agency, the Durham Affordable Housing Coalition, selected through a competitive RFP process to meet the measurable and time-bound deliverables of the 10-Year Plan to End Homelessness. Triangle United Way serves as a pass-through for funding from the County and City, and then to the DAHC, which monitors their progress. The initial contract period was for March 1, 2007 through August 31, 2007.

As required in the Agreement, the Executive Team, with assistance from Triangle United Way and the Implementing Agency, will provide mid-term and annual reports to the County Commissioners and the City Council. A mid-term report was presented to the Commissioners on June 4, 2007. Representatives will be present to report on the progress made during that contract period.

Additionally, for FY 2007-2008, the County Commissioners and City Council approved funding for the implementation of the 10-Year Plan at \$98,000 or \$49,000, respectively. The Triangle United Way is renewing their contract with the DAHC for implementation of the Plan. This contract will be for the period of September 1, 2007 through June 30, 2008.

Edythe Hall Thompson, Durham Affordable Housing Coalition, gave the following presentation regarding the Project Homeless Connect Report:

Who are the Homeless?

- Chronically Homeless
- Female Headed Households
- Men without Employment Opportunities
- Multi-Cultural Families
- Defenseless Children

PHC Meeting Human Needs

Project Homeless Connect Services

- Employment
- Legal Aid
- Childcare
- Medicare/SSI
- Health Services
- Mental Health
- Housing
- Triage/Counseling

- VA Assistance
- Personal Care

Intake Workers Conduct Pre-Screening and Exit Interviews
Project Homeless Connect One-Stop Services

Project Homeless Connect Outcomes

- Over 250 individuals served in one day
- Cost Effective Service Delivery
- Targeted support based on need
- Coordination and cooperation between Agencies/City and County
- Volunteer Opportunities
- Corporate Involvement
- Demonstration of strategies to end homelessness

Rich Lee, Triangle United Way, continued the presentation by discussing the following highlights regarding PHC:

- Helped secure more than \$950,000 to support 10-Year Plan Activities
 - \$644,280 N. C. State grant
 - \$300,000 City of Durham
 - \$11,965 N. C. Interagency Council for Coordinating Homeless Programs and Triangle United Way
- Durham team participated in Regional Homelessness Media Training
- Created Marketing/Fundraising Team
- Durham team made site visit to Knoxville, Tennessee

Contract Deliverables Met:

- Supported efforts of Durham County Dept. of Social Services and the Durham Center to develop and Adult System of Care that initially will focus on assisting high users of crisis/emergency services who are homeless or at risk of homelessness.
- Completed survey of City and County Departments to assess their capacity to help implement 10-Year Plan
- Complete assessment of public and private funds spent addressing homelessness in Durham
- Completed assessment of housing developer capacity to meet housing goals of the 10-Year Plan, specifically the 150 new units of Supportive Housing for Homeless Persons with a disability condition
- Developed Funding Strategy to support implementation of 10-Year Plan including long-term strategy to meet housing goals outlined in Plan

Reconvened four (04) Results Teams who are working on implementation strategies outlined in 10-Year Plan:

- Permanent Housing—developing funding strategies to meet housing goals outlines in Plan
- Access to Services—coordinating adult System of Care (SOC) trainings and service coordination
- Income—evaluating current job training and job placement programs
- Prevention—evaluating discharge planning by state and local institutions

Increased participation in County's Homeless Management Information System (HMIS). Specifically, worked with Urban Ministries of Durham and Durham Rescue Mission to address their software and/or hardware needs so they can send data on their shelter and transitional housing program participants.

Other Project Activities:

- Submitted 2007 Durham Continuum of Care application of U.S. Dept. of Housing & Urban Development (June) requesting \$777,318 in funding to support 01 new supportive housing project and provide renewal funding for 02 existing programs.
- Completed 2007 Durham Point-in-Time Count of Homeless persons (Jan) and data analysis

Funding Strategies

- Permanent Housing Funding
- Implementation of 10-Year Plan

Homeless Spending Analysis

Total Spent of Emergency Assistance: \$2, 246,755

Funding for Permanent Supportive Housing: \$3,120,328

Funding for Transitional Housing & Emergency Shelters: \$4,909,937

Next Steps-Scope of Works

- 2008 Point in time Count-benchmarks
- 2008 CoC HUD Federal Grant Application
- Implement priorities of results teams
- Donor Advised Fund-Capital Campaign
- Housing Consortium-Leveraging funds
- Create Advertising Materials
- Marketing 10-Year Plan to Communities
- Create new partnerships to support the Plan
- 2008 Project Homeless Connect Events

In response to Commissioner Page's question regarding surplus properties, Mr. Lee stated that a certain scale is needed to make the projects viable for the support of housing units that are being proposed for new construction, such as onsite support services or management needed. For the chronically homeless population, the surplus properties are not the housing type that would support the chronically homeless.

Ms. Thompson spoke about the additional housing strategies in the current year that would address housing needs.

Chairman Reckhow commended the Durham Housing Coalition regarding the assessment and financing strategy. She inquired about all cost associated with running the homeless shelter relating to what is spent through General Services and on debt service bonds.

Mr. Lee informed the Board that General Services did complete the survey. The information is included in the summary about what is currently spent to support the homeless assistance programs.

Directives

1. Have a discussion with Triangle United Way about designating contributions to the homeless.
2. Mr. Lee to obtain the amount spent from the County Manager relating to the expansion of the homeless shelter.

Work First Program Update

Sammy R. Haithcock, DSS Director, introduced this item, stating that the Work First Program is measured each year by the North Carolina Division of Social Services in the level of goals accomplished against state goals. The Durham County Department of Social Services operates the Program and state-approved Work First Block Grant Plan. The Department will update the Board on goals accomplished during Fiscal year 2006-2007.

Rhonda Stevens, Division Director, provided the following update regarding the Work First Program:

Durham County Work First Program Update Case Profile

- Household Composition
 - 86% Child Only
 - 14% Adult Led
- Age of Adults
 - 54% age 18 to 29
 - 44% age 30 to 49
 - 2% age 50 and over
- Number of Children Per Case
 - 64% one child or less
 - 36% two or more children

Time on Program by Individual

- 29% 0-6 months
- 9% 7-12 months
- 12% 13-24 months
- 9% 25-36 months
- 7% 37-48 months

- 5% 49-60 months
- 28% over 60 months

Adults Entering Employment (chart)

Percent of Achievement to Goal (chart)

Providing Employment Services – All Parent (chart)

Provide Employment Services – Two Parent (chart)

All-Parent – Participation Rate

Two-Parent Participation Rate

State Participation Rates

- 40.22% is state's average All-Parent Participation Rate
- 58.32% is the state's average Two-Parent Participation Rate
- 24 Counties met the All-Parent Participation Rate
- Buncombe, Cumberland, Orange, and Wake were in the group that met the All-Parent rate
- 11 Counties met the Two-Parent Participation Rate
- Buncombe, Mecklenburg, and New Hanover were in the group that met the Two-Parent rate

Employment Six Months after Leaving Work First (chart)

Remaining off Work First due to Employment (chart)

Wages Earned for 2006-2007 Fiscal Year

- Average wage earned—\$8.61 per hour
- Highest wage earned—\$20.31 per hour
- Lowest hourly wage earned—\$5.25 (excluding those paid hourly + tips)
- More than 55 of those employed earned more than \$10.00 an hour

Commissioner Cousin inquired about the percentage of individuals that are being helped by the Work First program.

Directives

1. DSS Director to consider revamping the efforts of enhancing economic security in the community.
2. Bring a report to the Board indicating the total amount of individuals that were helped by Work First in this fiscal year.

Resolution Approving Lease for the City of Medicine Academy

Pursuant to NC General Statute § 115C-530, the Board of Education requested that the County approve the proposed operational lease between the Durham Public Schools Board of Education and Beaches West Development, Ltd. for a portion of the real property located at 4100 N. Roxboro Rd. which will house the City of Medicine Academy.

Although the County is not a party to the lease agreement, N.C.G.S. § 115C-530 requires that operational leases entered into by a local board of education for a term of three years or more must be approved by a resolution adopted by the Board of County Commissioners.

Vice-Chairman Heron moved, seconded by Commissioner Page to suspend the rules.

The motion carried with the following vote:

Ayes: Cousin, Heron, Page, and Reckhow

Noes: None

Absent: Cheek

Commissioner Cousin moved, seconded by Vice-Chairman Heron to approve the Resolution and approve the operational lease between the Durham Public Schools Board of Education and Beaches West Development, Ltd. for a portion of the real property located at 4100 N. Roxboro Rd. which will house the City of Medicine Academy

The motion carried with the following vote:

Ayes: Cousin, Heron, Page, and Reckhow

Noes: None

Absent: Cheek

Presentation of The Durham Center Fiscal Year-End Report

Ellen Holliman, Area Director, The Durham Center, introduced this item. She stated that the Durham Center has completed its Fiscal Year 2006-2007 Report detailing its activities in service of local citizens faced with mental health, developmental disability, and substance abuse issues. Included in the Report are data addressing crisis facility and State hospital bed use, updates on the implementation of evidence-based practices, jail diversion activities and our housing initiative, and a variety of departmental reports.

Ms. Holliman elaborated on the following contents of the report and addressed questions from the Commissioners:

- Durham Center Access
 - DCA Bed and Chair Admissions
 - DCA Bed and Chair Utilization
- Housing Services
- Jail Diversion

Chairman Reckhow encouraged the remaining Board members to review The Durham Center's report and note the accomplishments for FY 2006-07.

Directive

1. Ellen Holliman to expand the explanation of the School Child and Family Support Team Program.

County Finance Policy

George Quick, Finance Director, asked that the Board review and approve the County Finance Policy and with the following changes:

- Fund Balance: 1.08 - Once the 15% level has been achieved, the amount over 15% may be used to fund pay-as-you-go capital projects or other non-reoccurring expenditures.
- Debt Management: 5.05 (f) - Total debt service shall not exceed 15% of total current expenditures net of pass-through including current debt service. (During FY2006, Davenport provided the BOCC with a profile for AAA Counties. One of the elements was the level of debt service as a percentage of expenditures.)

All other items in the current approved policy remain unchanged.

County Attorney Chuck Kitchen expressed concern about placing wording in the policy that may or may not come to fruition.

The Board held a discussion regarding the County Finance Policy.

Directive

1. George Quick to revise the Revenues and Collections 3.06 portion of the finance policy.

Durham County Jail Expansion Needs Assessment

County Manager Mike Ruffin introduced this item, stating that the Board of County Commissioners reviewed a needs assessment for the Durham County Jail during its August Worksession. The assessment indicated that an additional 664 jail beds would be required by 2030. Presently, the facility has 736 beds. Staff was directed to review alternatives that would provide short and mid-term solutions to squeeze more efficiency out of the existing facility as well as present a plan of action for the construction of additional jail beds. Those options will be presented to and discuss with the Board by representatives from the Sheriff's Office, Criminal Justice Resource Center, and County Engineering Department.

Wes Crabtree, Chief Deputy, discussed the operational matters raised in the jail expansion needs assessment.

Glen Whisler, P.E., County Engineer, reported the mid-term and long-term initiatives related to the jail study. He discussed the following:

- Detention Center Improvements
- Detention Center Expansion
- Durham County Detention Facility Bed Counts

Donnie Phillips, Contractor, The Durham Center, discussed the mental health portion that was discussed in the jail study.

Gudrun Parmer, CJRC Director, discussed the pretrial service initiatives. She discussed several opportunities for enhancement and/or expansion. She stated that there are several strategies that can be implemented immediately; others will require longer planning, additional funding, and/or additional staff. Through continuous dialogue with court and county officials, the operating procedures to maximize jail inmate release efforts will be reviewed and revised.

Ms. Parmer provided the following cost estimates for the expansion of pretrial services:

Electronic Monitoring

1. Expand current contract by five cellular units
\$6.50 (per unit/day) \$33/day
Jan. to Jun 07 \$5,039
Annualized \$12,045
2. Replace 10 Radio Frequency Unit with Cellular Units and add 5 Cellular
Jan. to Jun 07 \$16,084
Annual \$32,168
3. Expansion to 50 slots: 25 RF and 25 Cell Units
Radio Frequency \$13.99 (per unit/day)
Cellular \$15.99 (per unit/day)
Annual \$274,317

Personnel

1. Case Manager and Pretrial Specialist (full-time)
Salary \$32,000
Benefits \$11,205
Jan. to June \$21,602.50
Annual \$43,205 per position
2. Pretrial Specialist (part-time, 15 hours/wk)
Salary \$12,800
FICA only \$979
Jan. to June \$6,890
Annual \$13,780

Security

1. Change current CPO Guard to SPO Officer
Increase in hourly rate \$7.51
Jan. to June \$10,051
2. Add Armed Officer to current security detail

Hourly	\$24.71
Jan. to June	\$33,729.15
Annual	\$67,458.30

Predictive Dialer

Televoxx System	
Start Up	\$699
Monthly Cost	\$200
Jan. to June	\$1,299
Annual	\$2,400

Directives

1. Consider a lower security facility for incarcerated misdemeanants to lower the cost.
2. Gudrun Parmer to work with County Manager to bring a proposal that would determine what items should be implemented in short-term.

Closed Session

Commissioner Cousin moved, seconded by Commissioner Page to adjourn to closed session to consult with an attorney concerning *County v. Woodall, et al.*, 06 CVS 6793, and to preserve the attorney-client privilege pursuant to G.S. § 143-318.11(a)(3).

The motion carried with the following vote:

Ayes: Cousin, Heron, Page, and Reckhow
Noes: None
Absent: Cheek

Reconvene to Open Session

County Attorney Chuck Kitchen stated that an impasse was reached in closed session regarding the case of *Durham County v. Woodall*. A recent offer was made to the County Attorney suggesting a settlement in the amount of \$550,000 for the property owned by Mr. David Woodall.

Commissioner Page seconded by Commissioner Cousin to suspend the rules.

The motion carried with the following vote:

Ayes: Cousin, Heron, Page, and Reckhow
Noes: None
Absent: Cheek

Commissioner Page moved, seconded by Commissioner Cousin to approve the settlement and authorize the County Attorney to conclude the litigation in the matter of Durham County v. Woodall.

The motion carried with the following vote:

Ayes: Cousin, Heron, Page, and Reckhow

Noes: None

Absent: Cheek

Adjournment

There being no further business, Chairman Reckhow adjourned the meeting at 12:10 p.m.

Respectfully Submitted,

Angela M. McIver
Staff Specialist
Clerk to the Board's office